The real problem with Ajax is perception: We look like a bunch of amateurs to our enemies
What really is the issue with Ajax?
On the face of it, it looks a decent vehicle and the concept is sound, with the US Bradley fighting vehicle, of similar concept, being one of the great 'western military' kit success stories in Ukraine.
Surely, this cannot be yet another multi-million-pound white elephant that many are suggesting.
Rarely a case of one-shot success
Many so-called experts will argue whether Ajax is a tank or not, but with 23 years as a tank commander and over a year of academic research for my new book, Tank Command, I have a view.
Ajax has tracks, a hull, a turret and a gun, the prerequisite requirements to be called a tank; same in the First World War, same now.
At over 40 tonnes, Ajax would be designated a heavy tank in the Second World War, similar in weight to the mighty Sherman and all-conquering Tiger, but axiomatically, with less main armament firepower.
The holy trinity of tank design throughout time, and true today, is Firepower, Protection and Mobility. I proffer that it is the last requirement where Ajax falls short, and limited as it is at the moment to 15 mph, it is a dead duck.
As someone with screeching tinnitus, from too many years on 'heavy' tanks, I sympathise with the current tankies who are operating these 'light' tanks, but I am also astounded by the apparent antipathy between the manufacturer and the users – something has gone seriously wrong.
Many of the issues highlighted in the 'leaked' video doing the rounds on the shortcomings of Ajax, showing bits falling off and getting everybody so vexed, seem pretty usual for armoured vehicles in general, but I did grow up on Chieftain, and it was always a shock if it started first time and got to the ranges without breaking down.
Lack of action is harming our credibility
The Strategic Defence Review looks a very good assessment of the future military capability we need to produce a credible, conventional deterrence to ostensibly Putin, but it is all somewhat unpicked by procurement black holes like Ajax.
Whatever the reality of the Ajax programme, the perception no doubt to our adversaries is that we are a bunch of amateurs, most especially when it comes to developing new kit.
Ajax has been around, if you include the ASCOD programme, which seems to have all its DNA, which General Dynamics is liberally swishing about, for more than 20 years.
One would hope that the quality issues highlighted in some of the videos bouncing around social media, can be sorted by GD in short order, and there is a suggestion that the vibration problems may be able to be solved with rubber tracks.
I'm rather surprised it did not have rubber tracks to start with. It is staggering that a concept 20 years old and eight years late should still be showing such basic failures.
Focus on battlefield dangers has limited capabilities
The overweight problem, I expect, is due to some military scientist producing some calculation which requires Ajax to be almost 20 tonnes heavier than ASCORD, which it is developed from, and the CV90, perhaps the vehicle we should have procured in the first place, because of the additional armour required to counter every conceivable threat.
I have had similar experiences with the development of the British respirator, which is large and cumbersome because it is designed to protect against every conceivable threat, however unlikely.
Axiomatically, it appears to be the MOD's reluctance to accept risk on the battlefield, which is so inherently dangerous anyway, which has created in no small way the Ajax conundrum.
Its biggest threat will be drones, not the 120mm tank fire that all those extra 20 tonnes are there to protect against.
Speaking to those who are currently crewing the vehicle, I understand the turret, target acquisition and kill systems, intelligent gathering systems and defensive aid suites are second to none.
Basically, the top half of this mini, I hesitate to say 'light or medium' tank is brilliant, the bottom half not so.
Willingness to act is what's needed
As the Defence Secretary seems open to cancelling the programme, it will no doubt be labelled as another 'hangover' from the Tory government, and the Army could yet again miss out on the MOD big bucks for a capability it and the country desperately needs.
Ukraine has reminded us that mass is still important and quantity has a quality all its own, but no Ajax and only 70,000 soldiers shout the antipathies of this to our adversaries, who are currently legion, most especially with a Russian accent.
We must not hurry to throw Ajax out with the indignant bath water of military procurement.
One of the real Western success stories of Western kit in Ukraine is the US Bradley fighting vehicle, which, to even an expert, does not look and feel too different from Ajax – so the concept is sound.
With that thought, perhaps the minister should consider leasing Bradleys or CV90s as a stop-gap, which would enable him to either cancel Ajax completely or give GD time to get Ajax on 'track'?
Let us not forget, when Challenger 2 came into service in the late 90s, and I was the Second in Command of 2RTR, the second regiment to get the new tank, there were similar problems to Ajax.
However, the government and MOD of the day held Vickers', the manufacturer, feet very firmly in the fire, and we got a brilliant tank, which 25 years later is still wreaking havoc and tearing up today's battlefield in Ukraine.
No doubt there are many on both the commercial and military side of the fence who should shoulder the responsibility for this debacle, but I'm not convinced they will!!
Colonel Hamish de Bretton-Gordon is a former commander of the 1st Royal Tank Regiment. His next book, Tank Command, is published on 4 June 2026.
Related topics
Join Our Newsletter
