Polycrisis: the meaning of the term and how it applies to Op Epic Fury and Iranian response
Back in October 2025, a paper by the private intelligence firm Sibylline coined the term "polycrisis" – used to describe a clustering of security and economic shocks, driven by a possible Chinese move against Taiwan and follow-on pressure from Russia, Iran and North Korea.
The report, written by Sibylline's chief executive Justin Crump alongside analysts Sam Olsen and Derek Leatherdale, predicted 2027 would be the pinch point for such a culmination of crises to begin.
However, questions are now arising as to whether the polycrisis has arrived sooner than expected, as the Iranian response to the US-led Operation Epic Fury puts pressure on the defence capabilities of the UK and other European nations at a time when they have already been depleted by Russia's war in Ukraine.
What is a polycrisis?
'Poly' comes from the Greek polys meaning 'many'. Put simply, a polycrisis just means many crises happening at the same time.
Sibylline uses 'polycrisis' to describe a period where separate shocks do not stay separate; a security crisis triggers an economic shock, which feeds political instability, which then narrows military options.
The 2025 report envisages a cluster of crises lining up on the same runway, with China launching military action against Taiwan, a further deterioration of relations between Russia and Nato, a breakdown in Middle East shipping, all engendering political instability in the West.
The pinch point is put at 2027, with Western rearmament not being able to catch up fast enough to act decisively.
Taiwan: chips, energy and coercion short of invasion
The report puts artificial intelligence at the centre of its 2027 timeline.
The claim is not just that AI will change warfare and economies, but that a winner-takes-all outcome is plausible if one side reaches superhuman capability first.
Advanced semiconductors sit at the centre of achieving superhuman AI capacity, with Taiwan's chip industry dominating the most advanced segment of the global market.
A key US benchmark is 2027, with the Pentagon saying Xi Jinping has directed the People's Liberation Army to be ready for a Taiwan operation by then.
The most likely opening move is not necessarily an invasion. Options include a blockade, or a 'quarantine' framed as law enforcement, designed to restrict air and sea access while blurring the legal case for an immediate US military response.
Taiwan's vulnerability in a shipping squeeze is energy. The island imports 97% of its energy and holds stocks estimated at around 39 days of coal and 11 days of natural gas.
A quarantine or blockade that interrupts Taiwan's trade, especially chips, is linked to an estimated 5% hit to global GDP.
Russia: a Nato cohesion test
Russia is rebuilding military capability despite the war in Ukraine and could choose grey zone activity or a limited conventional operation to test Nato cohesion.
While the report says Russia is unlikely to be fully rearmed for large-scale war by 2027, it argues Moscow could still mount targeted operations to create and exploit divisions within Nato, including by forcing allies to decide whether to treat an incident as an Article 5 test.
The paper suggests Russia could time any move to coincide with a Taiwan crisis, creating a multi-theatre strain on Western decision-making.
It also paints a bleak picture of Europe's ability to generate combat power quickly, arguing that even with pledged spending increases, industrial capacity and supply-chain dependence will limit short-term results.
From cloud services to F-35 aircraft capacity, Europe's defence technology and industrial base is heavily dependent on the US and China.
Europe: rearming, but not in time
Europe's rearmament is presented as real but slow. The paper draws a sharp line between spending pledges and fielded capability in the next two years.
It also frames industrial dependence as a constraint with cloud services dominated by US firms, and manufacturing inputs and materials linked to China.
Even with money, the argument runs, output and resilience are limited by supply chains and production capacity.
Apart from conflict in the Middle East, North Korea appears as a second-front risk in Asia: escalation through missile activity, cyber attacks or localised provocations designed to keep US and allied forces tied down.
Related topics
Join Our Newsletter
